The Lone Actor Terrorist and the TRAP-18 by Meloy, R & Gill, P
 1 
The Lone-Actor Terrorist and the TRAP-18 
 
 
 
Lone actor terrorism is considered a major national security threat in both 
North America and Europe.  Although the focus has been on violent Islamic jihadists, 
and most recently both recruitment and attacks by individuals inspired by ISIS, such 
threats come from the extremes, regardless of ideology.  As Pascal wrote over three 
centuries ago, “les extremes se touchent,” the extremes meet (Paul, 1905, p. 22).  For 
example, despite the inordinate attention paid to jihadist violence in the United 
States, there have been an almost equal number of murders by individuals from the 
extreme right when compared to jihadists since 9/11, and twice as many attacks by 
the extreme right (New America Foundation, 2016). 
 
Efforts to counter such violence, and to distinguish between those who have the 
legally protected right in democracies to have extreme beliefs from those who 
intend to act violently on their extreme beliefs, have, in part, focused upon risk 
assessment of such individuals.  The Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol 
(TRAP-18) is an attempt to advance these efforts. 
 
 
 Over the past forty years there has been a slow and steady evolution in the 
understanding of the individual terrorist, both theoretically and empirically (Gill, 
2015; Simon, 2013; Sageman, 2008).  The past few years in particular have seen a 
burgeoning of empirical studies, many of them challenging earlier theoretical 
misconceptions concerning the lone terrorist, such as the absence of mental 
disorder or socioeconomic deprivation (Borum, Fein & Vossekuil, 2012; Borum, 
2014; Gill, 2015; Gill et al., 2014; Gill, Horgan, Hunter & Cushenberry, 2013; Corner 
& Gill, 2014; Gruenwald et al., 2013; Bryneillson et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2014; 
Spaaj,  2012; Simon, 2013; Sageman, 2008; Hamm and Spaaj, 2015; Horgan, 2005, 
2008; Weenink, 2015; Meloy, 2011; Meloy & Yakeley, 2014; Bergen, 2016).  Such 
work has contributed to the development of three published structured assessment 
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instruments for the coding of behaviors for terrorist risk, including the Violent 
Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA; Pressman, 2009) modeled after the HCR-20 (see 
Douglas et al., 2013 for the newest version 3),  the Multi-Level Guidelines for the 
Assessment and Management of Group-Based Violence (MLG; Cook et al., 2013), and 
the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+; Lloyd and Dean, 2015).  Other coding tools 
have proliferated among various law enforcement and security agencies in both 
North America and Europe, some of them classified, but without the requisite peer-
reviewed research to demonstrate their scientific reliability and validity before 
being operationally utilized. Such criticism, however, must also acknowledge the 
compelling need for intelligence gathering in a world where a heightened awareness 
of risk is ubiquitous (Meloy & Hoffmann, 2014).  
  
In response to these needs, Monahan (2012) articulated the present state of the 
science concerning the “conceptual and methodological challenges” that must be 
surmounted to advance the risk assessment of individual terrorism.  He elaborated 
upon four problems: 1) the need for clarity as to what is being assessed; 2) the likely 
usefulness of structured professional judgment; 3) the identification of robust risk 
factors within four domains:  ideologies, grievances, affiliations, and moral 
emotions; and 4) the very low probability of prospective validation.  In a follow up 
chapter, Monahan (2016) reported on the positive advances since his earlier paper, 
and added the domain of “identities” to his four domains of risk.  However, he also 
noted the continued stagnation in terrorism research due to the lack of political will 
to bring together the academic and intelligence communities.  He posited that the 
most realistic research endeavors will be “known outcome” studies where 
comparisons are made between those who have and have not carried out terrorist 
acts on putative risk factors. 
 Monahan (2012) furthermore noted in a comparison of the general criminal 
violence risk research and the terrorism research that there is little overlap, 
necessitating the development of a structured professional judgment instrument 
specific to terrorism: 
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“From the existing research, therefore, it appears that none of the four overlapping 
dimensions of the risk of common violence identified by Kroner et al (2005)—
criminal history, an irresponsible lifestyle, psychopathy and criminal attitudes, and 
substance abuse—characterize those who commit violent terrorism. In addition, 
there is little empirical evidence supporting the validity of other putative risk 
factors for terrorism beyond what is already obvious (i.e., age, gender, and perhaps 
marital status). Indeed, the strongest empirical findings are entirely negative: 
terrorists in general tend not to be impoverished or mentally ill or substance 
abusers or psychopaths or otherwise criminal; suicidal terrorists tend not to be 
clinically suicidal. In no society studied to date have personality traits been found to 
distinguish those who engage in terrorism from those who refrain from it 
(Monahan, 2012, p.   ).” 
 
The purpose of this study is to present an investigative template which may 
eventually provide a reasonable assessment of risk of lone-actor terrorism, based 
upon the recommendations of Monahan (2012, 2016) and incorporating work on 
proximal warning behaviors for targeted violence (Meloy, 2011; Meloy et al., 2012) 
and distal characteristics of the lone terrorist (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).  The 
proximal warning behaviors, a typology derived from the threat assessment 
literature (Meloy et al., 2012; Meloy & Hoffmann, 2014), have been found to have 
ecological validity across a range of targeted violence domains, such as public figure 
attackers and school attackers, both in the United States and Europe (Hoffmann et 
al., 2011; Meloy et al., 2014a, 2014b).  They have also shown postdictive validity 
when discriminating between German school shooters and other students of 
concern with no intent to attack (Meloy et al., 2014b).  The distal characteristics are 
based upon the psychosocial research concerning lone actor terrorism conducted 
during the past decade (Borum, Fein & Vossekuil, 2012; Borum, 2014, 2015; Gill, 
2015; Gill et al., 2014; Corner & Gill, 2014; Gruenwald et al., 2013; Spaaj, 2012; 
Simon, 2013; Sageman, 2008; Hamm and Spaaj, 2015) as well as the original 
psychodynamic formulations of the authors (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).  One study has 
found these distal characteristics to have some criterion validity, and good to 
 4 
excellent interrater reliability, in a small sample of European individual terrorists 
(Meloy, Roshdi, Glaz-Ocik & Hoffmann, 2015). This rationally-derived theoretical 
model is applied in this study to an existing large dataset of lone-actor terrorists in 
the United States and Europe to test its criterion validity from several perspectives.  
The instrument is called the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol, and 
consists of 18 coded behavioral patterns (TRAP-18).  Although the TRAP-18 may 
complement the other three instruments noted earlier (MLG, VERA, ERG 22+), what 
it brings to the task which the others do not is a focus only on targeted violence—
acts which are intended and purposeful—rather than general violence, the lone-
actor terrorist as distinct from terrorists under external command and control, and 
a proposed temporal distinction between indicators which may compel active risk 
management in temporal proximity to a possible terrorist act, and those more distal 
characteristics which may only need active monitoring.  Such a distinction, we 
believe, can aid in the prioritizing of cases and operational efficiencies for more 
effective utilization of resources 
 
    Definition of Terms for the TRAP-18 
 
The TRAP-18 consists of two sets of indicators: first, eight warning  
behaviors which were originally developed to identify patterns of proximal risk for 
intended or targeted violence, in contrast to the more common mode of violence 
which is typically impulsive or reactive (Siegel & Victoroff, 2009; Meloy et al., 2012).  
Second, ten distal characteristics of the lone terrorist derived from studying the 
extant empirical and theoretical research on terrorism and the first author’s 
experience as a forensic psychologist (Meloy, 2004, 2011) in directly and indirectly 
assessing both foreign and domestic lone terrorists over the past twenty years and 
his thematic review of these clinical cases (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). This work 
occurred as both a privately retained consultant for various entities, as well as 
public retention by the FBI and other agencies within the US Government.  The 
privately retained work involved domestic lone actor terrorists and terrorist cells 
who ideologically framed their motivations with both secular (two examples, the 
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single issue of use of lethal force by police officers and adherents of the Patriot 
Movement) and religious ideologies (for example, a religious belief in the end times 
and the need to offensively pre-empt Armageddon).  The work for both the FBI and 
other government agencies remains classified.  The ten characteristics are 
psychodynamically, psychobiologically, and psychosocially based, and define more 
chronic and distal aspects of the lone actor terrorist that may prompt further 
intelligence gathering and monitoring, but may stop short of the active risk 
management which is compelled by the presence of a warning behavior.  This 
formulation is conceptually based upon the work of Monahan and Steadman (1996) 
who applied the meteorological distinction between watching and warning to 
assessing the risk of violence.   The category of watching implied a more distant risk 
which should be monitored, while a warning was reserved for a threat that 
compelled immediate and active risk management. The eight proximal warning 
behaviors and 10 distal characteristics combine to form the TRAP-18. 
 
The Warning Behavior Typology 
 
These are proximal and dynamic patterns which may indicate accelerating risk for 
targeted violence. The warning behaviors are not discrete variables, but patterns for 
analysis  (Meloy et al., 2014, Guldimann et al., 2013). Typologies can provide a 
framework to help think about multiple dimensions of a problem and how those 
dimensions might interact (Borum et al., 2012); pattern analysis has its roots in 
gestalt psychology (Kohler, 1929; Koffka, 1921; Wertheimer, 1938) and capitalizes 
on normal cognitive-perception to organize bits of detail into meaningful patterns. 
The behavioral patterns are coded as present if any pre-offense behavior is found to 
have a reasonably certain fit with the proffered descriptions:  
 
Pathway warning behavior is research, planning, preparation or implementation of 
an attack (Calhoun & Weston, 2003; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998).  These are the latter 
stage markers on the pathway as defined by Calhoun & Weston (2003) and exclude 
the earlier markers, such as an initial personal grievance and ideation, defined in 
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their theoretical model, and captured by the first distal characteristic of the TRAP-
18 below. 
 
Fixation warning behavior indicates an increasingly pathological preoccupation 
with a person or a cause, accompanied by a deterioration in social and occupational 
life (Mullen et al., 2009).   It is distinguished from normal fixations such as intense 
enthusiasm over a sports team, the early stages of romance, and lifelong hobbies. 
 
Identification warning behavior indicates a psychological desire to be a pseudo-
commando (Dietz, 1986; Knoll, 2010), have a warrior mentality (Hempel, Meloy & 
Richards, 1999), closely associate with weapons or other military or law 
enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify 
oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause or belief system (Meloy, Mohandie, 
Knoll & Hoffmann, 2015).   It is notable as a shift from believing what others do 
(fixation) to wanting to become who they are, and may embrace both nonfictional 
and fictional individuals and groups. 
 
Novel Aggression warning behavior is an act of violence that appears unrelated to 
any targeted violence pathway and is committed for the first time (Meloy et al., 
2012).  It is understood to be a behavior with which the subject tests his actual 
ability to be violent, and is distinguished from the distal characteristic of a history of 
criminal violence. 
 
Energy Burst warning behavior is an increase in the frequency or variety of any 
noted activities related to the target, even if the activities themselves are relatively 
innocuous, usually in the days, weeks, or hours before the attack (Odgers et al., 
2009; Meloy et al., 2012).   It can only be calculated if there is already an established 
baseline of behavioral activity through prior intelligence gathering. 
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Leakage warning behavior is the communication to a third party of an intent to do 
harm to a target through an attack (Meloy & O´Toole, 2011).  It is only coded if it was 
known or could have been known by others prior to the attack. 
 
Last Resort warning behavior is evidence of a „violent action imperative“ and „time 
imperative“ (Mohandie & Duffy, 1999); it is often a signal of desperation or distress.  
The subject has decided that there is no other alternative than to be violent toward 
the target.  Sometimes it is triggered by a major loss or anticipated loss. 
 
Directly Communicated Threat warning behavior is the communication of a direct 
threat to the target or law enforcement beforehand (Meloy et al., 2012).   
 
The 10 Distal Characteristics of the Lone-Actor Terrorist  
 
Personal Grievance and Moral Outrage join both personal life experience and 
particular historical, religious, or political events.  The personal grievance is often 
defined by a major loss in love or work, feelings of anger and humiliation, and the 
blaming of others.  Moral outrage is typically a vicarious identification with a group 
which has suffered, even though the lone-actor terrorist has usually not experienced 
the same suffering, if any at all.  In a few cases, there will only be a personal 
grievance, yet it is comprehended and often magnified by the next characteristic. 
 
Framed by an Ideology is the presence of beliefs which justify the terrorist’s intent to 
act. It can be a religious belief system, a political philosophy, a secular commitment, 
a one-issue conflict, or an idiosyncratic justification (Simon, 2013; Meloy et al., 
2014).   Often the belief system is cherry-picked for words and phrases which justify 
targeted violence, and intellectual understanding of the ideology is superficial and 
simplistic. 
 
Failure to Affiliate with an Extremist Group is defined by the actual failure and/or 
rejection of the lone-actor terrorist from a radical or extremist group with which he 
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wants to join (Puckitt, 2001).  In some cases, the subject has rejected the extremist 
group, or the group’s beliefs are too moderate for him. 
 
Dependence on the Virtual Community is evidence of the lone-actor terrorist’s active 
communication with others through social media, chat rooms, e-mails, list-servs, 
texting, tweeting, etc. about his radical or extreme beliefs (see Gill, Corner, Conway, 
Thornton, Bloom and Horgan , forthcoming, for a further elaboration) .  This also 
includes learning tactical skills concerning his act of terrorism from others through 
the internet.  The extensive use of social media may only involve posting of opinions, 
activities, or intent for some individuals.  In all cases, dependence implies some 
amount of reliance on the internet, and should be broadly interpreted for coding. 
 
Thwarting of Occupational Goals is a major setback or failure in a planned academic 
and/or occupational life course.  
 
Changes in Thinking and Emotion is indicated when thoughts and their expression 
become more strident, simplistic, and absolute.  Argument ceases, and preaching 
begins.  Persuasion yields to imposition of one’s beliefs on others. There is no 
criticial analysis of theory or opinion, and the mantra, „don’t think, just believe,“ is 
adopted.  Emotions typically move from anger and argument, to contempt and 
disdain for others’ beliefs, to disgust for the outgroup and a willingness to 
homicidally aggress against them (Matsumoto et al., 2015).  Violence is cloaked in 
self righteousness and the pretense of superior belief. Humor is lost.   The warning 
behavior of fixation may be apparent throughout these changes, but fixation is 
defined by thought content, while this distal characteristic is change in the 
interpersonal expression of that content.  Expressiveness may suddenly diminish 
when the subject goes operational and enters the later stages of the pathway. 
 
Failure of Sexual-Intimate Pair Bonding  is coded if the subject has historically failed 
to form a lasting sexually intimate relationship. The sexualization of violence may be 
a secondary component. It refers to the finding of a sexual attitude or behavior in 
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the subject which appears to substitute for the absence of a sexual pair bond, such 
as the sexualization of weapons, the anticipation of unlimited sexual gratification in 
the afterlife (libido in the service of thanatos), the exclusive use of prostitutes and 
other unbonded sources of sexual gratification, or compulsive use of pornography: 
all of these behaviors may be rationalized by the ideology; eg, among jihadists, the 
adoption of more liberal sexual behaviors may be acceptable because they help 
maintain operational secrecy in the West through deception of others. 
 
Mental Disorder is coded if there was evidence of a major mental disorder by history 
or at present.  Whether or not ideology helped buffer the symptoms of mental 
disorder is a secondary, but important consideration (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014): an 
esoteric or nihilistic belief is utilized by the individual to manage the anxiety of a 
decompensating mind. This characteristic was called “nexus of psychopathology and 
ideology” in the foundational publication (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). 
 
Greater Creativity and Innovation is coded if there was evidence of tactical  thinking 
„outside the box” (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014; Simon, 2013).   It was operationalized for 
this study by coding whether the terrorist act was innovative and/or subsequently 
imitated by others. 
 
Criminal Violence is coded if there was evidence of instrumental criminal violence by 
history separate from the terrorist act..  Predatory (instrumental) violence contrasts 
with affective violence, which is an emotional and reactive mode of violence to an 
imminent threat (Meloy, 1988, 2006).  There is an extensive body of research which 
indicates that these modes of violence are somewhat biologically distinctive in 
mammals (Siegel and Victoroff, 2009).  Predatory violence biologically underpins 
the pathway warning behavior, which is concerned with late stage tactical markers, 
but is coded here only if found in the subject’s history of instrumental criminal 
behavior.  Virtually all acts of terrorism are predatory (instrumental) violence.  This 
characteristic indicates both a capacity and a willingness to engage in predation for 
a variety of reasons, such as a history of armed robberies or planned assaults on 
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others.  Although the instrumentality of the violence is emphasized, it may be 
difficult to code this aspect of criminality due to a paucity of investigative reports on 
the subject’s history.  This characteristic was called “predatory violence” in the 
original foundational publication (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). 
 
Methods 
 
The Sample 
 
The sample consists of 111 lone-actors from the United States and Europe who 
engaged in, or planned to engage in acts of lone-actor terrorism, and were convicted 
for their actions or died during the commission of their offenses (Gill, Horgan & 
Deckert, 2013; Corner & Gill, 2014; Gill, 2015).  Terrorism was defined as “the use or 
threat of action where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or 
to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and/or the use or threat is made 
for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause” (p. 2, Gill et 
al., 2013).  The sample includes only lone-actors who actively planned and carried 
out an attack. Lone-actor terrorists were identified through the academic literature, 
LexisNexus, the Global Terrorism Database developed by the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of 
Maryland, and lists of those convicted of acts of terrorism in the United Kingdom 
and the United States.  All lone-actors engaged in their acts between 1990 and 2014, 
a twenty-five year period (Gill, 2015).   
 
Data Collection and Measurement  
 
The original codebook utilized in the study of these 111 terrorists is outlined in 
detail elsewhere (Gill, 2015) and is available from the second author as 
supplementary material.  For this study questions from the codebook which 
addressed the 18 behavioral patterns in the TRAP were selected by the authors. This 
methodology presented several challenges: first, a number of the TRAP-18 
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indicators emphasize underlying motivation, whereas the original coding of the 111 
terrorists emphasized behaviors; second, the TRAP-18 focuses on patterns of 
behaviors, rather than discrete acts, eg, pathway vs. procurement of weapons.  This 
led to the necessity of judgment, and in some cases, extrapolation, to identify 
clusters of behaviors in the original coding that fit within a TRAP indicator.  Both of 
these problems increased the subjectivity of the research task, which was addressed 
in two ways: the researchers conferred on the choice of codebook variables for each 
of the TRAP indicators, capitalizing on their respective understanding of the 
development of the TRAP-18 and its meaning, and the complete database 
underlying the 111 terrorists; and second, each of the TRAP-18 indicators below 
identify the discrete variables from the original codebook that were utilized, our 
comments, and the percentage of the subjects who were positive on that particular 
variable.   
 We then did two further analyses: we divided the subjects into three 
different ideological groups: radical Islamic extremists, extreme right wing 
terrorists, and single issue terrorists as defined in the original study (Gill, 2015), and 
compared the frequencies of the TRAP-18 indicators across the three groups.  The 
final analysis compared successful vs. thwarted attackers across the TRAP-18 
indicators.  The original lone-actor dataset  (Gill, 2015) included both successful 
actors and those who were thwarted in their plans. A thwarted attack covered plots 
which were developed by lone actor terrorists that were 
interrupted/uncovered/stopped by some form of policing/intelligence/security 
organization and subsequently led to a conviction. It did not include cases of 
individuals caught up in FBI sting operations (these are omitted from the data 
entirely). It also did not include 'material support' cases: in other words, individuals 
in the U.S. who were charged with (18 USC Section 2339A) knowingly and 
intentionally providing training, expert advice, service, or personnel for terrorist 
endeavors  
 
 
Statistics 
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All descriptive analyses are expressed in frequencies where data were 
known.  All comparative analyses utilized nonparametric statistics (X2) to 
determine significance, which was set at p<.05, and phi coefficients to determine the 
effect size of any significant difference.  Effect sizes were interpreted utilizing Cohen 
(1988; .10=small, .30=medium, .50=large). 
 
 
Results 
 
Each of the 111 subjects had to have at least one or more of the coded variables to 
be counted as a subject who displayed that particular TRAP indicator.  Many 
subjects had more than one variable within each TRAP indicator, but would only be 
counted once.  For example, the first distal characteristic, personal grievance and 
moral outrage, has within it 8 originally coded variables.  In order for a subject to be 
counted as demonstrating that distal characteristic, he would have to have at least 
one of the original coded variables, but could have several more.  The frequency 
percentages for the originally coded variables are listed in parentheses. 
 
Coding of distal characteristics 
      
For the characteristic ‘personal grievance and moral outrage’, we included 
behaviors such as whether the individual experienced, in the build up to the event, 
being: degraded (18%), the target of an act of prejudice/unfairness (23%), lied to or 
disrespected (23%), ignored or treated poorly by someone important to them 
(11%), or the victim of a verbal or physical assault (14%) We also included whether 
he recently became unemployed (29%), demonstrated a tipping point in the 
progression of the grievance (62%), or experienced financial problems (28%).   
These variables addressed both interpersonal and work-related negative events. 
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For the characteristic ‘framed by an ideology’, 39% were right-wing inspired, 27% 
were single-issue1 inspired and 34% were Islamic extremists.   These variables 
defined the ideological persuasion of the subjects. 
 
In terms of ‘failure to affiliate with an extremist group’, we coded whether the 
individual failed to recruit others or form his/her own group prior to the event 
(22%) and whether the individual was rejected entry from an 
activist/pressure/terrorist group prior to the event (14%).  These variables 
included the subject as both rejector and rejected. 
 
‘Dependence on the virtual community’ included two behaviors that catalogued 
whether the individual interacted online with co-ideologues (30%) and whether the 
individual used the internet to specifically learn some aspect of their plot (42%).  
These variables both infer reliance on the internet, but also capture both interaction 
with others as well as tactical learning devoid of direct interaction. 
 
‘Thwarting of occupational goals’ neatly corresponds to behaviors such as whether 
the individual became recently unemployed (29%), recently dropped out of 
school/university (13%), had an upcoming life change he/she did not want (9%), 
experienced a downturn in their work (12%) or academic performance (3%), and 
was interrupted in working on a proximate goal (14%).  
 
The characteristic ‘changes in thinking and emotion’ encapsulates behaviors such as 
whether the individual produced their own propaganda (25%), sought 
legitimization for their plans from leading epistemic authority figures (14%), 
intensified their religious (25%) or ideological beliefs (48%) prior to the build up of 
their plot, was angry in the lead up to the event (55%), and whether the individual 
denounced others who shared their ideology (12%).  Although these variables cover 
a wide range of activities, they infer the emotions of anger and contemptuous 
                                                        
1 This is a broad amalgamation of disparate ideologies including environmentalism, anti-abortionism, 
and animals’ rights.  
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devaluation of others’ beliefs, and a sanctioning of their own acts in relation to their 
evolving beliefs. 
 
For the characteristic ‘failure of sexual-intimate pair bonding’, we looked at whether 
the individual was single (59%), experienced problems in personal relationships in 
the build up to the plot (29%), and whether they were characterized as socially 
isolated (55%).  All of these variables code in the direction of chronic interpersonal 
failures. 
 
We examined whether the individual had a history of mental illness (41%) for the 
characteristic  ‘mental disorder’.    This variable captures a history of mental health 
problems some time in the life course of the subject. Corner & Gill (2015) created 
and coded variables concerning mental illness diagnoses, including number and 
name of diagnoses and diagnostic categories. These variables were created 
following examination of the extensive literature available on each actor. The names 
of the diagnoses were located in the literature, and reliability and quality of the 
source was taken into account. To ascertain number of diagnoses the same process 
was carried out. Diagnostic categories were noted either from a confirmed diagnosis 
in articles, or from a series of symptoms that were cross-referenced with diagnostic 
material, and given a provisional diagnosis (ICD-10, World Health Organization, 
2013). The diagnoses included traumatic brain injury, drug dependence, schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, psychotic disorder, depression, bipolar 
disorder, unspecified anxiety disorders, dissociative disorders, OCD, PTSD, unspecified 
sleep disorder, unspecified personality disorder, and autism spectrum disorder. Corner, 
Gill and Mason (2016) provide a descriptive analysis of the prevalence of these 
different disorders in this sample.  
 
The characteristic ‘creativity and innovation’  was demonstrated by Gill et al (2014) 
to have two key components: the degree to which a product is novel/original and 
also generalizable. We coded whether other lone actors had previously carried out a 
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particular attack type. If not, the attack was coded as novel/original (22%). If an 
attack inspired copycats, it was coded as generalizable (14%). 
 
The ‘criminal violence’ characteristic asks whether the individual had a history of 
instrumental and violent criminal behavior prior to their lone-actor terrorist plot 
(30%). 
 
 
Coding of proximal warning behaviors 
 
The ‘pathway warning behavior’  includes whether the individual engaged in 
preparatory activities (24%), demonstrated evidence of bomb-making manuals in 
the offender’s home (42%), engaged in dry-runs (30%),  received hands-on training 
for an event (23%) and had a stockpile of weapons (57%).   All of these variables are 
specific to research, planning, and preparation for the terrorist act, and by definition 
negate the notions of impulsivity and “snapping.” 
 
 
The following behaviors were included for ‘fixation warning behavior’: whether the 
individual’s ideological (48%) or religious (25%) orientation intensified prior to the 
event, or if the ideological (18%) or religious (15%) belief changed, if the person’s 
anger was escalating prior to the attack (33%) and whether the individual seemed 
obsessed with one specific event or phenomena (26%).  These variables capture the 
increasing anger and intensity of the pathological preoccupation (Meloy et al., 
2012). 
 
‘Identification’ included whether the individual claimed to be part of a wider 
group/movement or characterized their actions as a group/movement  (46%), if 
there were evidence to suggest the individual read literature/propaganda from a 
wider movement (60%) or other lone-actor terrorists (18%).  Although these 
 16 
variables do not directly address self-identification, they suggest an increasing 
interest in others’ actions, perhaps to be like them. 
 
Whether the individual engaged in other forms of violent behavior prior to the event 
(17%) summed up the ‘novel aggression’ characteristic.   Again, this is an 
extrapolation of one behavioral variable to measure a testing of the subject’s ability 
to be violent, and should be viewed as an estimate due to its subjectivity.   
 
‘Energy burst’ included whether the individual increased levels of physical activity 
or outside excursions prior to the event (8%).   This is a difficult variable to code, 
often due to the lack of information and attention to this warning behavior during 
the original data gathering, or the lack of calibration of the subject’s normal level of 
activity. 
 
‘Leakage’ covers a range of behaviors including whether the individual produced 
letters/public statements prior to the event regarding their ideology (59%), made 
verbal statements to a wider audience about their intent or belief prior to the event 
(49%), let others know about their grievance (74%) or ideology (68%) or intent 
(51%) and also whether they expressed a desire to hurt others (65%).   All of these 
coded variables capture leakage to third parties, whether individuals or the 
universe of internet users.  All of these variables also exclude a directly 
communicated threat to the target beforehand. 
 
If the individual cleared out his/her bank accounts (4%) or paid off their debt (2%) 
prior to the event, it was coded under the ‘last resort’ characteristic. The same also 
applied to the following three behaviors: upcoming life change (9%), work-related 
loss or stressor (16%), and being a helpless victim (12%).   Some of these coded 
behaviors suggest a sense of the subject perhaps feeling trapped, but the 
extrapolation to “last resort” is not exact by any means due to the limitations of the 
original coding. 
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Finally, if the subject provided a specific pre-event warning (22%), it was 
considered a ‘directly communicated threat’.  Although prior research indicates that 
direct threats will occur in a minority of cases of targeted violence, they always 
warrant attention by the threat assessor (Meloy, Sheridan & Hoffmann, 2008). 
 
We then assessed the prevalence of each TRAP indicator across the 111 lone-actor 
terrorists (see Table 1). Obviously each lone-actor terrorist can experience more 
than one coded behavior within each indicator, so the figures in Table 1 are not a 
sum of the coded behaviors.   The prevalence percentage, instead, represents the 
number of lone actor terrorists who had at least one or more coded behavior 
assigned to each of the TRAP-18 indicators. 
 
Table 1: Prevalence of TRAP 18 Indicators Across 111 Lone Actor Terrorists 
Indicator Prevalence 
Personal Grievance & Moral Outrage 78% 
Framed by an Ideology 100% 
Failure to Affiliate with an Extremist Group 29% 
Dependence on the Virtual Community 49% 
Thwarting of Occupational Goals 55% 
Changes in Thinking & Emotion 88% 
Failure of Sexual-Intimate Pair Bonding 84% 
 Mental Disorder 41% 
Creativity & Innovation 29% 
Criminal Violence by History 30% 
Pathway Warning Behavior 80% 
Fixation  77% 
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Identification 77% 
Novel Aggression 17% 
Energy Burst 8% 
Leakage 85% 
Last Resort 28% 
Directly Communicated Threat 22% 
 
We then examined the degree to which each lone actor experienced each TRAP-18 
indicator. One individual displayed 16 of the 18 indicators, one scored 15 out of 18, 
five  scored 14 out of 18,  another 5 scored 13 out of 18, eleven scored 12 out of 18, 
18 scored 1 1 out of 18, 25 displayed 10 indicators, 12 displayed half of the 
indicators .  In sum, 70% of the 111 lone actors demonstrated at  least  half the 
TRAP-18 indicators. 
 
Across ideologies, there was no difference in terms of the prevalence of indicators 
on display with each averaging between 9.5 and 9.9. However, there were four 
(p<.05) significant differences in terms of which indicators each ideology was likely 
to display: personal grievance and moral outrage, dependence on the virtual 
community, thwarting of occupational goals, and fixation.  The results are displayed 
in Table 2. Islamic extremist lone-actors were significantly more likely to display 
dependence on the virtual community than the single-issue terrorists.    Extreme 
right-wing lone actors were significantly less likely to display personal grievance 
and moral outrage, thwarting of occupational goals, and fixation warning behaviors 
than either the Islamic extremists or the single-issue terrorists. Single-issue lone 
actors were significantly less likely to display dependence on virtual communities 
than the Islamic extremists. There were no significant differences in the other 
proximal warning behaviors and distal characteristics. 
 
Table 2: Prevalence of TRAP 18 Indicators Across Ideologies 
Indicators Islamic Extreme Single- Prevalence 
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Extremist 
(n=38) 
Right-
Wing(n=43) 
Issue 
(n=30) 
Overall 
(N=111) 
Personal Grievance & 
Moral Outrage 
84% 67%* 87% 78% 
Framed by an Ideology 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Failure to Affiliate with an 
Extremist Group 
18% 33% 37% 29% 
Dependence on the 
Virtual Community 
63%* 51% 26%** 49% 
Thwarting of 
Occupational Goals 
66% 42%* 60% 55% 
Changes in Thinking & 
Emotion 
92% 84% 90% 88% 
Failure of Sexual-Intimate 
Pair Bonding 
87% 86% 77% 84% 
Mental Disorder 32% 40% 53% 41% 
Creativity & Innovation 29% 28% 30% 29% 
Criminal Violence by 
history 
29% 33% 27% 30% 
Pathway Warning 
Behavior 
76% 81% 83% 80% 
Fixation  84% 65%* 83% 77% 
Identification 68% 86% 73% 77% 
Novel Aggression 13% 19% 20% 17% 
Energy Burst 8% 9% 7% 8% 
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Leakage 79% 88% 87% 85% 
Last Resort 32% 26% 27% 28% 
Directly Communicated 
Threat 
21% 16% 30% 22% 
 * = p = < .05, ** = p = < .01, *** = p = < .001 
 
 
The successful vs. thwarted attackers are represented in Table 3.  Those who 
successfully carried out an attack were significantly more likely to display the 
following distal characteristics a) failure of sexual-intimate pair bonding (p=.002, 
phi = .293) (b) creativity and innovation (p=.045, phi=.190) and (c) fixation warning 
behavior (p=.032, phi=.204). Those who were thwarted in their attack plans were 
significantly more likely to display dependence on the virtual community (p=.0008, 
phi=.317) and pathway warning behavior (p=.005, phi=.264). All these effect sizes 
were small to medium. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of TRAP-18 variables between successful and thwarted 
attackers 
Characteristic Attack 
Carried Out 
(n=67) 
Attack 
Thwarted 
(n=44) 
Prevalence 
Overall 
(N=111) 
Personal Grievance & 
Moral Outrage 
82% 73% 78% 
Framed by an Ideology 100% 100% 100% 
Failure to Affiliate with 
an Extremist Group 
27% 32% 29% 
Dependence on the 
Virtual Community 
36% 68%**** 49% 
Thwarting of 
Occupational Goals 
57% 52% 55% 
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Changes in Thinking & 
Emotion 
93% 82% 88% 
Failure of Sexual-
Intimate Pair Bonding 
93%** 71% 84% 
Mental Disorder 45% 34% 41% 
Creativity & Innovation 36%* 18% 29% 
Criminal Violence by 
history 
35% 23% 30% 
Pathway Warning 
Behavior 
72% 93%**** 80% 
Fixation  84%* 66% 77% 
Identification 72% 84% 77% 
Novel Aggression 18% 16% 17% 
Energy Burst 8% 9% 8% 
Leakage 90% 77% 85% 
Last Resort 34% 18% 28% 
Directly 
Communicated Threat 
20% 23% 22% 
* = p = .045, ** = p = .032, *** = p = .002 ****p=.005, *****p=.0008 
     
Discussion 
 
 
The TRAP-18 combines 8 proximal warning behaviors with 10 distal characteristics 
of lone actor terrorists (Meloy et al., 2011; Meloy & Yakeley, 2012).  Some of these 
definitions have been slightly modified from the original publications as noted to 
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provide clarity and efficiency in coding for operational use The purpose of 
separating proximal and distal characteristics is to draw the distinction between 
watching and warning (Monahan and Steadman, 1996).  We think the presence of 
distal characteristics compel active monitoring (the watching).  The presence of 
proximal warning behaviors compel active risk management (the warning).  
However, even though a temporal difference between the proximal warning 
behaviors and the distal characteristics makes logical sense, eg, the late stages of 
pathway behavior would follow personal grievance and moral outrage, this needs to 
be empirically tested.  Likewise, within the proximal warning behaviors, the time 
frame attached to novel aggression (“days, weeks or hours before the attack”) is a 
formulation from our experience, not empirical testing. 
 
In this study we viewed a large open source database of lone actor terrorists in the 
United States and Europe (N=111) derived from another study (Gill, 2015) through 
the lens of the TRAP-18.  Our purpose was to test its criterion validity from several 
perspectives.  This sample spanned a 25 year period (1990-2014), and was further 
divided according to ideological motivation (radical Islamism, right wing extremism, 
and single issue extremism) and whether the terrorist act was thwarted or 
successful. 
 
Seventy percent of the subjects were positive on at least half the TRAP-18 
indicators.  Seventy-seven percent or more evidenced four proximal warning 
behaviors: pathway, fixation, identification, and leakage.  These elevations are 
consistent with other domains of targeted violence, such as public figure attackers 
and school attackers (Hoffmann et al., 2011; Meloy et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015).    
 
Pathway, fixation, and identification—in this study occurring in 80%, 77%, and 77% 
of the subjects, respectively--, have emerged as three very robust proximal warning 
behaviors when retrospectively analyzed in various domains of subjects who have 
carried out acts of targeted violence.  Hoffmann et al (2011) found in a small sample 
of nonterrorist attackers of public figures in Germany a frequency of 100% for both 
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pathway and fixation, and 57% for identification.  Meloy et al. (2014a) found a 
similar frequency—94%, 78%, and 56%--for US Presidential and political attackers 
and assassins.  In a small sample of German school shooters, all three warning 
behaviors occurred at a frequency of 100%, but more importantly, discriminated 
them with large effect sizes from other students of concern who had no intent to be 
violent—along with novel aggression and last resort (Meloy et al., 2014b).  Novel 
aggression and last resort in this study were coded in a small minority of cases, 
unlike other studies, which may be a real finding, or due to the lack of goodness of fit 
between the coded variables and these two warning behaviors.  Leakage occurred in 
85% of this sample of lone actor terrorists, and is ubiquitous across virtually all 
domains of targeted violent events which have been studied (Fein & Vossekuil, 
1999; Meloy et al., 2014a; O’Toole, 2000; Vossekuil et al., 2002), even though the 
definition used in our studies is more narrow than when it was originally construed 
(O’Toole, 2000; Meloy & O’Toole, 2011).  However, it appears to not have the 
discriminatory power of pathway, fixation, and identification.  From a practical 
threat assessment perspective, this means that leakage, given its frequency, will 
often be a point of entry for the threat assessor in a case, but he or she needs to look 
for other warning behaviors to determine whether the case warrants more 
aggressive risk management.   Directly communicated threats, once again, are 
infrequent, and occurred in only 22% of the lone actor terrorist cases.  This finding, 
however, is very similar to other research over the past twenty-five years, beginning 
with Dietz and Martell (1989), Fein and Vossekuil (1999), and Hempel et al. (1999) 
who found that most targeted violence subjects do not warn their targets 
beforehand, an obvious tactical maneuver which enhances their probability of 
success.  Although this fact is widely known among threat assessors, there is still the 
wrong assumption among many law enforcement personnel that if there is no 
directly communicated threat, there is no risk of violence.  Direct threats are most 
useful, common and predictive of violence in domestic cases (Campbell et al., 2003). 
 
Seventy-eight percent or more of the subjects evidenced four distal characteristics: 
personal grievance and moral outrage, framed by an ideology, changes in thinking 
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and emotion, and failure of sexual pair bonding.  Four out of ten had a mental 
disorder.   These findings support the work of other researchers, including Monahan 
(2012) and Spaaj (2012). 
 
Both the warning behaviors and distal characteristics were originally derived 
through a rational-theoretical approach to the extant literature, and were not 
specifically focused upon any one ideology; this study empirically supports the 
general usefulness of the TRAP-18 since there were only four significant differences 
among the three ideological samples: personal grievance and moral outrage, 
dependence on the virtual community, thwarting of occupational goals, and fixation.  
This suggests that the TRAP-18 can be utilized in the investigation of a subject of 
concern regardless of ideology, and supports the utility of the instrument across 
various operational efforts to interdict lone actor terrorists with different 
ideological motivations.  This contrasts with the inherent limitations of other 
investigative methods which focus only upon jihahists (Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2011).  This TRAP analysis across ideologies is striking given 
the Gill (2015) finding of major significant differences in individual characteristics 
and antecedent event behaviors across the three ideologies in the same sample.  Gill 
(2015) recommended in future studies the use of multi-dimensional scaling 
techniques: this is a much more sophisticated analysis wherein variables that 
regularly co-occur are plotted closer together in Euclidean space.  
 
Comparison of successful and thwarted attackers utilizing the TRAP-18 was an 
attempt to measure the difference between those subjects who attacked and those 
who were interdicted before the attack, another aspect of criterion validity called 
postdictive validity.    A better measure of postdictive validity would be to compare 
this entire sample to other subjects of concern, but upon investigation had no intent 
to attack.  Unfortunately, such a comparison sample was not available at the time of 
this study, and awaits further testing.  Nevertheless, our findings have specific 
operational utility.  The TRAP-18 was able to discriminate among those lone actor 
terrorists who were successful in their attacks from those who were thwarted based 
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upon five variables:  the successful attackers were more likely to be fixated, creative 
and innovative, and had a history of failures in sexually intimate pair bonding; and 
were less likely to evidence the final stages of pathway behavior and be dependent 
upon a virtual community.  These findings make both theoretical and practical 
sense.  Less evidence of pathway behavior would suggest less observation by others, 
either third parties or law enforcement.  This could have many determinants, 
including deliberate secrecy, luck, or inadequate intelligence gathering.  Fixation as 
the second proximal warning behavior which discriminated suggests that a subject’s 
preoccupation with his cause, despite deterioration in work and love, will advance 
his plan. Such preoccupation may have a variety of determinants, ranging from an 
obsessional disorder, delusion, or anger, to boredom or disciplined resolve.  This 
finding is also consistent with a study of nonterrorist attackers of western European 
politicians which found that fixation was strongly correlated with being a loner and 
lethality risk toward the target (James, Mullen, Meloy, Pathe, Preston, Farnham & 
Darnley, 2007).  Fixation also suggests an intensity of pursuit in a larger stalking 
context (Meloy & Hoffmann, 2014; Mullen, James, Meloy et al., 2008).  A history of 
failures of sexually intimate pair bonding, a distal characteristic, would likely 
contribute to the subject’s aloneness (Borum, 2014), and therefore lower the risk of 
others becoming aware of his activities (Gill, 2015).  In the more general criminal 
literature, a positive attachment is also associated with a decreased risk of criminal 
violence (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999). Creativity and innovation, a distal characteristic 
that is related to success of an attack, supports the phenomenological position that 
the unknown unknowns are the most dangerous facts within a risk assessment for 
targeted violence.  If defenders cannot or do not think outside the box, they will 
remain one step behind the lone actor terrorist. 
 
The other distal characteristic which was more prevalent among the thwarted than 
the successful attackers was dependence on the virtual community.  This makes 
common sense since communication and interaction via the internet, especially 
through the proliferating social media technologies, increases the risk that someone 
privy to such chatter will convey their concern to the authorities responsible for the 
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public safety.  Although overall leakage was very frequent (90% v. 77%) in both 
groups, it appears that the illusion of privacy—or the impunity of grandiosity--on 
the internet is one of the most common vulnerabilities of the lone actor terrorist, 
and strongly correlates with failure (p=.0008, phi=.317).  In fact, this variable had 
the largest effect size among the five—although all effect sizes (the strength of the 
difference) were small to medium.  Gill (2015) has analyzed the reasons for virtual 
interaction: reinforcement of beliefs, seeking legitimization for their actions, 
disseminating propaganda, recruitment, and signaling the attack.  Virtual learning 
includes accessing ideological content, opting for violence, choosing a target, attack 
preparation, and overcoming hurdles.  Bergen (2016) found in his sample of 330 
people in the US charged with some type of terrorist crime since 9/11, that 40% 
maintained a presence on the Internet or used it for operational purposes.  
However, there is a risk to these rewards, as our data suggest.   
 
Dependence on the internet has also changed dramatically over the 25 year period 
of this study’s lone actor terrorists, from its complete absence in 1990 through the 
remarkable acceleration in use of social media between 2005-2014.  Change over 
time is not accounted for in our analysis, and there is a likely trend in a decrease in 
the failure to affiliate with an actual group and an increase in dependence on the 
virtual community—a sea change from affiliation to inspiration as the motivation to 
act, in some cases the result of what Meloy (2016) has called “cajoling” through 
social media.  This awaits further study.   
 
These thwarted vs successful attack differences, however, should be treated with 
caution.  The TRAP indicators which discriminated may be a product of unknown 
artifacts, such as aspects of the investigation, pre-emptive policing, tips, luck, the 
year of the interdiction, ideological contributions, and the specific countries in 
which these different cases occurred.  There are a multitude of unknown factors 
which may have influenced group placement as either thwarted or successful and 
may be unrelated to the five identified TRAP indicators.  
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Limitations 
 
This known group outcome study has some limitations: all data were open source 
and retrospective, with the possibility of both hindsight bias and observational bias 
affecting the results.   There were also noted discrepancies between the definitions 
of the 18 variables and the data from the codebook (Gill, 2015) utilized to determine 
presence or absence of the variables.  For example, leakage is a communication to a 
third party of intent to attack a target (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011), but the questions 
from the codebook provided a broader array of data for “leakage” which may have 
inflated the frequency of this particular variable. It was decided to err on the side of 
behavioral inclusion.  Also, there is one dependent variable, “framed by ideology,” 
which is contaminated by the independent variable that we utilized to define 
terrorist subjects for the study, “…advancing a political, religious, or ideological 
cause.”  Although these variables are not exactly the same, their equivalence likely 
inflated the findings concerning the distal characteristic of “framed by ideology.” 
 
Although the results support some aspects of criterion validity of the TRAP-18— its 
usefulness across ideologically different terrorists, and some postdictive validity 
when comparing successful and thwarted attackers, the authors--who did the 
mapping of the TRAP indicators onto the variables in the codebook--were not blind 
to group membership, and there was no independent determination of interrater 
reliability, only careful discussion and consensus.  This is a weakness of the study.  
However, a previous study of a small sample of European individual terrorists 
utilizing the TRAP found an overall kappa of 0.895 for interrater reliability with two 
independent raters (Meloy, Roshdi, Glaz-Ocik & Hoffmann, 2015).  Finally, 
confirmatory bias may be present in this study given the desire of the first author to 
empirically buttress the TRAP-18.  Further research is necessary by independent 
groups with independent samples to see if the TRAP-18 withstands further scrutiny, 
including larger samples and known outcome (postdictive) designs. 
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Practical Applications 
 
The TRAP-18 appears to have utility as an investigative template and organizing 
tool to help counterterrorism threat assessors prioritize cases for monitoring or risk 
management.  Based upon the work of Monahan and Steadman (1996), we 
recommend that a case of concern be first investigated for any evidence of proximal 
warning behaviors.  Any one behavior would strongly suggest active risk 
management, a result of what meteorologists consider a Warning.  In the absence of 
any proximal warning behaviors, the case would be investigated for distal 
characteristics.  The presence of such characteristics—at this point we do not 
quantify how many—would warrant active monitoring of the case, what 
meteorologists would consider the result of a Watch.  Other structured professional 
judgment instruments which have been proposed, such as the VERA, the ERG 22+, 
and the MLG become additional sources to help organize data from a case.  Multi-
method assessments work best.  Throughout such intelligence analysis, however, it 
is critical to recognize that insufficient investigation does not mean the absence of 
an indicator.  Investigation must be as thorough as possible to render such an 
opinion and rule out any one of the TRAP-18 indicators. 
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